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V I.

In early 1997, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni' assembled a group
of individuals to discuss the creation of a set of guiding principles for
combatting impunity for international crimes. The group included myself,
Professor Michael Scharf,2 Professor Paul Williams,3 and Professor
Madeline Morris. During a period of six months, this group worked on
drafting a set of guidelines that would prohibit states from granting
amnesty, pardons, or token sentences to persons responsible for
committing international crimes. Once completed, the guidelines would be
provided to the international and United Nations community for
consideration and possible adoption.
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One component of the proposed guidelines is the creation of a
mechanism to facilitate and coordinate international efforts in bringing the
perpetrators of international crimes to justice and in rehabilitating the
national judicial systems of affected states. Madeline Morris and I were
assigned to draft this section of the guidelines.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice systems are among those institutions that suffer most during
violent conflicts. The collapse of state institutions like the judiciary is a
fundamental cause for the subsequent failure of the legal system and the
general breakdown of the rule of law. In a post-conflict intervention, the
international community must focus its efforts beyond peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions. There must be comprehensive efforts to support
structures that will ensure a lasting peace. Ensuring accountability and
rehabilitating the judicial system are fundamental to this effort.
There is a general consensus that the United Nations, international
agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and individual
governments providing post-conflict assistance in the justice sector need to
better coordinate their activities and ensure that programs are
complementary and collectively meeting the needs of the host country.
There is currently no international mechanism to bring together NGOs,
national governments, and United Nations agencies for post-conflict
accountability and judicial rehabilitation. There is also a need to react
rapidly to a post-conflict situation in order to gain credibility and separate
support from local NGOs.
At two recent international conferences, 5
individuals representing NGOs, national governments, international
organizations, and academia met to recommend ways to improve the
international community's approach to ensure accountability for war
criminals and met for assisting countries in judicial rehabilitation during a
post-conflict period.
One suggestion that emerged from the first
conference and was further discussed at the second conference was the
creation of a judicial response unit that could quickly respond to the
immediate and somewhat longer-term needs of judicial systems in postconflict environments.
This memo sets forth a framework for the creation of the
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC). In essence, ILAC, in
the aftermath of violent conflicts, would be able to facilitate and coordinate
NGO, government, and United Nations efforts in two crucial areas:

5. Both the March, 1997 and the October, 1997 conferences were organized by the
Stanley Foundation.
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bringing war criminals to justice, and rehabilitating the national judicial
and legal systems.
ILAC would work closely with international peace keepers, who
assume de facto, if not de jure, involvement in law enforcement functions
during a post-conflict situation. To date, peace keepers, civilian police,
and international police monitors have been forced to operate in
environments where the local criminal justice system has been decimated
or is simply non-existent.
ILAC would enter the post-conflict environment simultaneously
with, or as a close follow-up to, peacekeeping operations. Serving as a
locus of international legal assistance and domestic NGO involvement,
ILAC would coordinate the efforts of specialized agencies, NGOs, and
donor governments. Bringing together ideas and people, ILAC would
mobilize forces to sign onto a common set of principles and goals and to
operate in a coordinated and efficient manner.
ILAC would also focus on pressuring national governments to
pursue war crimes and human rights abuse prosecutions.
Countries
emerging from domestic or international conflict are generally fragile and
are almost certainly grappling with the traumatic effects of recently
committed war crimes and human rights abuses. Often, members of
emerging ruling governments have themselves violated international
humanitarian law and are thus more likely to advocate for a general policy
of amnesty, or other form of impunity, rather than a policy of
accountability. Governments in a post-conflict environment will frequently
argue that impunity and quick reconciliation are the only possible avenues,
considering that the destroyed judicial system is not capable of prosecuting
the alleged human rights abuses.
ILAC will foster governments'
compliance with their international obligations to prosecute alleged war
criminals and human rights violators. In addition, ILAC's presence may
help to deter further violations of international humanitarian law.

II.

THE ILAC MISSION
ILAC will be an association of international NGOs working
together to promote the rule of law throughout the world. ILAC will work
closely with local NGOs in affected States to ensure their immediate
involvement in the assistance projects.
Realizing that an independent and effectively run judicial system is
the sine qua non of the rule of law, ILAC will provide technical legal
assistance focused on the prosecution of alleged war criminals and human
rights abusers and on judicial restructuring in countries emerging from
domestic or international armed conflict, and it will be committed to
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effectuating the appropriate enforcement of humanitarian law and to
rebuilding their legal systems. Where appropriate, ILAC will also provide
services to facilitate the interaction of national and international criminal
jurisdictions.
Because ILAC is comprised of international NGOs experienced in
analyzing the state of legal systems and providing assistance to countries
developing their national judicial systems, it will be able to respond
quickly and effectively in providing needed post-conflict legal assistance.
ILAC will be firmly committed to the principles of national
sovereignty. ILAC will not seek to promote a particular legal system,
realizing that a broad-minded spirit towards other cultures and awareness
of the strengths of different legal systems are necessary to achieve the goal
of establishing effective judicial systems throughout the world.
ILAC will be premised on the belief that assistance in developing
judicial systems must be undertaken with the consent of national
governments. Cooperation between ILAC and national governments is
necessary if ILAC assistance is to be beneficial.
ILAC will be politically neutral, and it will conduct its work in a
manner that is transparent to the international community.
ILAC will be committed to a system of continuing self-evaluation,
and it will reform its practices in order to best meet the needs of the
victims of human rights abuses and to further the principles of justice and
fairness within the international community.
III.
THE STRUCTURE OF ILAC
ILAC will be a separate non-profit entity comprised of
international NGOs who are actively engaged in the development of
national judicial systems ,(e.g., the American Bar Association's Central and
East European Law Initiative (CEELI), the International Bar Association,
R6seau des Citoyens, International Judges' Association, Soros, and
Netherlands Association for the Judiciary).
It will be particularly
important for ILAC to be comprised of a full range of international NGOs
who have proven themselves to be capable of taking on the complex and
time-consuming responsibilities of post-conflict judicial reconstruction.
Pursuant to ILAC's by-laws, ILAC's members will elect an
Executive Board. The Board will be comprised of five permanent
members (to ensure geographical and program diversity), six rotating
members, and three Government/Agency Advisory Council members.
ILAC will have a permanent headquarters and a full-time staff,
consisting of a Director (who will oversee all ILAC operations); an
Administrative Assistant (who will assist the Executive Director); a Fund
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Raiser/Development Director (responsible for securing administrative and
programmatic funding); an Outreach Coordinator (responsible for
maintaining contact with members and securing personnel support for
program implementation); a Program Director (responsible for all
logistical support for implementing the two Rapid Response Programs,
including training mission participants); a Research Director (responsible
for preparing briefing papers for the ILAC missions); and an Accountant
(responsible for the overall financial management of the project).
ILAC members may decide to send personnel to the permanent
headquarters.
IV. THE GOVERNANCE OF ILAC
In order for ILAC to effectively accomplish its mission,
particularly the provision of on-ground technical legal assistance, ILAC
must gain international stature and authority. This will allow ILAC to
more easily mobilize national and international support for its work and to
achieve legal standing to quickly implement its programs in a host country.
The United Nations (e.g., U.N. DPKO, U.N. Human Rights
Center) may be an appropriate agency to undertake a cooperative role with
ILAC. There is already a close working relationship between United
Nations agencies and international NGOs. ILAC will also have to secure
close working relations with States, which may be called upon to intervene
in a post-conflict situation.
The cooperation between the United Nations and ILAC, and
support for ILAC's work, could be part of a larger United Nations Standby
Agreement (focused on international legal NGOs) that would permit the
United Nations to utilize ILAC when responding to affected States. The
paramount issue would be to ensure that ILAC could mobilize and engage
rapidly under United Nations auspices.
States may also want to utilize ILAC in their unilateral response to
a post-conflict situation. For instance, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) may want to call upon ILAC to assist
the agency in providing immediate assistance to a State emerging from
conflict.
An affected State may also appeal directly to ILAC for
assistance.
V.

COORDINATING MECHANISM FOR ILAC
The main programmatic objective of ILAC will be to rapidly and
effectively provide assistance to post-conflict national judicial systems. In
fulfilling its mission, ILAC will be able to provide two teams of legal
experts to assist the host country in the post-conflict environment. ILAC
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will be capable of sending two different types of teams of legal experts to
assist the host country in the post-conflict environment. Depending on the
needs of the affected State, one or both types of teams may be utilized.
A. JudicialAccountability Response Unit
The Judicial Accountability Response Unit (JARU) will support
international efforts to bring war criminals and human rights offenders to
justice. The JARU will be comprised of legal experts selected by ILAC.
The JARU will work closely with the ICC or any ad hoc tribunal
established to prosecute suspected war criminals and violators of
international humanitarian law.
The JARU will remain in country and focus on the following:
1)
Assist the government in designing a systematic approach
for prosecuting war criminals and human rights offenders;
2)
Assist the government in implementing the investigation
and prosecution of war criminals and human rights offenders
(including assistance to judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys);
3)
Support the creation of local human rights NGOs which
can sustain advocacy work;
4)
Assist in mobilizing support from the international
community for investigations and prosecutions, including financial
assistance and cooperation in gaining evidence and extradition of
indicted persons outside the country's territory;
5)
Monitor the government's performance in implementing
the system of accountability for war criminals and human rights
offenders (including trial monitoring);
6)
Serve as an objective source of information and deter the
dissemination of misinformation and disinformation;
7)
Create mechanisms to provide protection to potential
witnesses fearful of physical violence;
8)
Work with the Judicial Development Response Unit (see
section B below) in developing a judicial system that will initiate
an effective system of accountability, including assistance in
building judicial infrastructure, training legal personnel, and
reforming laws;
9)
Create a Rules of the Road project to ensure that the
process of detaining individuals by the government for serious
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violations of international humanitarian law is consistent with
international legal standards; and
10)
Provide liaison and coordination services where
appropriate to facilitate the interaction of the national justice
system and the ICC or any ad hoc international tribunal.
B. JudicialDevelopment Response Unit
The Judicial Development Response Unit (JDRU) will be
comprised of legal experts selected by ILAC. The JDRU will be
responsible for assessing the current state of the judicial system in the host
country. The JDRU will use a predetermined judicial assessment model to
identify which areas of the judicial system are intact, functional, and which
areas need to be re-deployed, recreated or redesigned. Based on this
assessment, ILAC will coordinate an outreach campaign among ILAC
members and donors so that they may undertake a more long-term program
of assistance and development.
The JDRU will serve as a bridge between initial peacekeeping
activities and long-term assistance. Once long-term ILAC members arrive
in the host country, the JDRU will continue to provide on-ground
coordination during the initial phase of operation. However, once ILAC
members establish their own coordinating mechanism to accomplish longterm judicial restructuring, the JDRU will relinquish involvement with the
judicial restructuring program.
Long-term judicial restructuring could address the following:
1)
Identify revisions to legislative and constitutional mandates
necessary for a truly independent and effective judiciary;
2)
Determine whether comprehensive jurisdiction is set within
the judiciary on all matters relating to the application of laws,
including violations of international humanitarian law;
3)
Determine whether there is sufficient financial support for
the judicial system;
4)
Determine whether there exists a sufficient number of
trained attorneys, judges, and court personnel to participate in a
revitalized judicial system; and
5)
Determine whether there are sufficient court facilities to
allow the judicial system to function.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There will undoubtedly be detractors of the ILAC concept. Some
will say that it is simply not needed. Others will suggest that States, not
NGOs, best handle post conflict rehabilitation. Still others will argue that
NGOs simply are not capable of coordinating their programs in any
meaningful way.
Yet, we believe ILAC is an idea whose time has come. The recent
experience in Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrates that there is a vast void in
a post-conflict situation, where the breakdown of the rule of law is
systemic, and the need for rapid post-conflict accountability and judicial
rehabilitation is essential. ILAC can become a crucial component to the
international community's response to the devastation of conflict within or
between states.

